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Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment Lessons Learned 
 
In June of 1999, the International Space Station (ISS) attempted a maneuver to avoid a high risk 
conjunction with a piece of a Russian Soyuz rocket body.  The maneuver failed.  Although the object 
missed the ISS and no harm was done to the vehicle or crew, this incident is considered a failure and an 
example of a breakdown in situational awareness. 
 
In July of 2009, just after the docking of STS-127, the ISS and Space Shuttle mated stack maneuvered to 
avoid a high risk conjunction from an unknown debris object.  This incident is considered a successful use 
of situational awareness to protect two human spaceflight vehicles and crews. 
 
This paper will compare and contrast these two incidents in human spaceflight conjunction assessment 
history.  Early in the ISS flight program, many lessons were learned regarding conjunction assessment and 
utilizing conjunction notifications.  Through this growing process, there is today a highly successful 
program of conjunction assessment to protect human spaceflight vehicles and crews.  This paper will 
explain the background behind these two incidents, as well as lessons learned which can be applied to 
future conjunction assessment activities. 
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Background
 Since First Element Launch in Nov 1998, the 
International Space Station (ISS) has had a continuous 
conjunction assessment team – on-call 24/7/365.
 During this time there have been over 700 conjunction 
notifications[1].
 Many lessons learned over the 12+ years of ISS 
operations.
 Examine an example of early conjunction incident 
(1999).
 Explain some lessons learned from this incident.
 See how these lessons are applied to a more recent 
conjunction example (2009).
[1] Taken from NASA Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Recent Conjunctions of Interest. Ansley Browns, CSM Workshop, Oct 20, 2010
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Acronyms
 DAM – Debris Avoidance Maneuver
 OSA – Orbital Safety Analyst (JSpOC team member 
responsible for predicting conjunctions for NASA)
 TCA – Time of Closest Approach
 TOPO – Trajectory Operations Officer (Houston 
Flight Control Team member responsible for 
conjunction assessment and collision avoidance)
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Conjunction Assessment History[2]
1992:
NASA begins Pc 
development for ISS 
CA
1998:
ISS First Element 
Launch1996:
NASA begins 
conjunction assessment 
of Mir space station
1999:
First ISS DAM attempted 
and fails; a few months 
later first ISS DAM 
successfully executed
1990s – present:
NASA works with USSTRATCOM to  
develop tools, data exchange 
formats, improve processes for 
catalog maintenance and CA 
Present:
NASA continues work with 
USSTRATCOM to maintain 
high quality CA for human 
spaceflight and robotic missions
2005:
NASA begins CA for 
robotic missions
[2] Adapted from NASA Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Recent Conjunctions of Interest. Ansley Browns, CSM Workshop, Oct 20, 2010
2000:
ISS permanent crew 
presence begins
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Object 1844
 TOPO notified of ISS conjunction with Object 1844 
on June 11, 1999.
 The following page presents a timeline of events as 
they transpired over ~1.5 days following notification of 
the conjunction.
 Following the timeline are some additional comments 
on the situation and the outcome.
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Object 1844 (con’t)
Timeline of Events
(Not to scale)
TCA
TOPO Notified of 
conjunction
Houston Flight 
Director and Russian 
personnel notified of 
conjunction
Tasking increased 
on object
Maneuver Plans 
generated
Houston operator 
distracted by 
unrelated event
Mistake caught 
and maneuver 
plan changed
Unsuccessful 
maneuver
-54 hrs -47 hrs -37 hrs -31 hrs -20 hrs -18 hrs
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Object 1844 (con’t)
 Maneuver execution needed to take place 18 hours or more 
before TCA due to constraint of flying over Russian ground 
sites immediately following the burn (this is no longer a 
constraint).
 Throughout the event there was confusion between TOPO
and OSA of what differential correction span to use.  
 Multiple solutions were delivered with no resolution as to 
what the correct solution should be.
 At the time, the OSA position was filled with military 
personnel, making consistent operations difficult due to 
frequent military rotations.
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Object 1844 (con’t)
 Distraction resulted in TOPO applying wrong time-tag to a 
vector sent to OSA for post-burn conjunction screening.  
 This was a manual data entry procedure.
 Incorrect vector produced false negative screening results.  The 
error was eventually corrected but required a late change in the 
burn plan.
 Russian command error resulted in loss of attitude control prior 
to the start of the DAM and hence failure of the burn.  
 Contributing factor to the command error was the late change in 
the burn plan.
 Attitude control was regained on the last Russian ground site pass 
of the day with ~14-28 hours of electrical power remaining.
 Ironically, post-event reconstruction showed low risk from the 
conjunction.
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Lessons Learned
 Notify people early, get everyone working toward the same 
goal and have an agreed-to timeline.
 If required, increase tasking early.  Waiting reduces the 
effectiveness.
 When operators are separated by great distances, it is 
important to understand as much as possible about what 
the other is doing so as to facilitate questions and 
discussion.
 Following this event, the OSA position was moved to 
contractor personnel, allowing for more retention of 
experienced operators.
 Automate critical data entry as much as possible.  Where 
automation is not possible, get two sets of eyes on the data.
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Object 84180
 Shuttle launched on July 15, 2009 for STS-127 
mission.
 TOPO notified of ISS conjunction with Object 84180 
on July 16, 2009.
 First notification ~44 hours prior to TCA – less time 
than the previous example.
 Notification came in the middle of Shuttle rendezvous 
profile (~26 hours prior to docking).
 TCA ~15.5 hours after docking (during crew sleep).
 Maneuver would need to be performed before sleep.
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Object 84180 (con’t)
 Within 2 hours, ISS, Shuttle, and International teams are 
briefed on the situation.
 Immediately following notification, discussions began 
about when to do a DAM if it became necessary and 
which vehicle would do it (Shuttle post-docking).
 Several discussions with OSA about increasing tracking 
and what resources are available.
 Some tracking passes were missed, but the situation was 
discussed and resolved.
 Post docking perturbations made the conjunction higher 
risk, so maneuver was executed successfully by Shuttle.
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Take-Aways
 Have a plan – don’t wait until you are over your head to 
start swimming.
 Be flexible – every event is unique, so understand when to 
deviate from the plan.
 Communicate – the easiest path to failure is a breakdown 
in communication. 
 Automate – relying on manual data entry for critical 
operations should be avoided where possible.
 Don’t automate too much – automating data entry is good, 
automating decision making is not.
 Weigh all the risks – sometimes doing a maneuver is more 
risky for the vehicle than the conjunction.  Don’t forget the 
big picture.
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Questions?
